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Speed and Pessimism: Moral Experience in the Work of Paul Virilio 
 
Paul Virilio passed away on the 10th of September 2018. An influential theorist of media, 
technology and communication, with a particular focus on the political question of speed, 
Virilio leaves behind a vast body of work – Negative Horizon, Open Sky, and Speed and 
Politics stand out – with which to theorise and problematise the transformation of human 
experience (see Pentzold, 2018, p. 930; Ytreberg, 2017, p. 313). His reputation for the 
negative, for excessive pessimism and a tendency to look for the very worst (see 
Hildebrand, 2018, p. 353), has led to an impression of Virilio as a moralist (see, for 
example, Featherstone, 2003, p. 198), a figure never warmly received, the preaching, 
pious character who decries the wayward path and the loss of worn values. But Virilio 
has been unfairly typecast. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that his work 
should be read instead as constituting a kind of dispersed moral philosophy that, far from 
being conservative, embraces the spontaneity and otherness of intersubjectivity. Virilio 
understood moral responsibility as something that is grounded in the encounter with the 
other as other, and it is argued that his work, taken together, comprises a rigorously 
sustained defence of the spaces of moral experience.  
 
In what follows the value of this moral work, and the conceptual art by which Virilio 
sustained it, is explored. This poses a methodological challenge, in that Virilio’s work is, 
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to a large extent, fragmentary. The difficulty is not only that there is no equivalent to a 
Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty, 2014) or a Totality and Infinity (Levinas, 
2007), no grand statement of a philosophical system, but that there is often little explicit 
narration of the development of his position across texts that are only loosely united by a 
sustained critique of the acceleration of communication and the role of war in the 
development of technology and society. Virilio’s work is episodic, or, as he himself saw 
it, more like a staircase: ‘I work out an idea and when I consider it suggestive enough, I 
jump a step to another idea without bothering with the development’ (in Crogan, 1999, p. 
168). The first section introduces Virilio, his life and – bearing in mind John Tomlinson’s 
(not unjustified) warning that it is ‘impossible to encapsulate Virilio’s work briefly’ 
(2007, p. 58) – at least his approach to the work of theory, as well as noting common 
criticisms of this project. There then follow three sections, three vignettes or perhaps 
exposures, that explore Virilio’s work with regard to a different technological 
circumstance: the Japanese shut-in culture of hikikomori; the viral pursuit of the warlord 
Joseph Kony; and the self-tracking devices by which we have come to pursue ourselves. 
The idea is not to lean into Virilio’s approach or to emulate its style, but to draw out an 
underpinning philosophy of moral experience and perception grounded in concrete 
examples that explicate and organise his contribution to theorising media and technology. 
The work undertaken here is both synthetic and interpretive, a mereological reading that 




The first vignette uses the example of the hikikomori to draw a distinction between 
visibility and vision. It is argued that when we have greater control over the visibility of 
the other then we are not as open to the vision of the other as a revelation of responsibility. 
The hikikomori are shown to provide a stark example of those populations left behind 
when a networked society becomes risk-averse and less hospitable to encounter. The 
second vignette takes the example of Kony 2012 in order to highlight the structural 
contradiction between viral activism and the logistics of perception. It is argued that 
whilst digital media allow us to see further, the cost of that visibility is borne by the 
populations of those parts of the world already devastated by colonialism, toiling away to 
extract the mineral core of digital technologies and suffering the worst of the 
environmental catastrophe that sustains our digital media. The speed of the viral in the 
case of Kony 2012 was predicated on the exploitation of those the campaign set out to 
help. The final vignette uses the example of fitness trackers to demonstrate how 
perception comes to be deferred to devices. It is argued that self-tracking encourages 
statistical conditioning towards a kind of movement without direction, which is contrasted 
with the idea of trajectory as an orientation towards the other. Self-trackers exemplify the 
way that information is used by corporations to monopolise perception at the expense of 
moral experience. In turns these vignettes explore responsibility with regards to the near, 
the far and the self, against a backdrop of the technological appropriation of perception. 
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Ultimately, what unites these examples is the question, posed throughout his work by 
Virilio, of how we are meant to feel at home amidst the pollution of our moral ecosystem. 
This presents a certain pessimism about speed, but one that is matched by its enthusiasm 
for moral encounter and a life lived towards others. The article concludes by drawing 
these threads together, but also with a call for the continuation of Virilio’s legacy to 
thinking critically about media and technology. 
 
 
Paul Virilio (1932-2018) 
 
Paul Virilio was born in Paris in 1932, the son of an Italian father and Breton mother. He 
was evacuated to Nantes on the Atlantic coast in 1939, where he lived under German 
occupation and Allied bombing. Virilio (1999, p. 14) described himself as ‘a Blitzkrieg 
Baby’, having grown up surrounded by the acceleration of war and its devastation. After 
the war, he studied art, specialising in stained glass and working with Georges Braque 
and Henri Matisse; he served in the Colonial Army during the Algerian War of 
Independence; he converted to Catholicism under the guidance of the worker-priests that 
ministered to the industrial working class; and he studied at the Sorbonne under Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Jean Wahl (‘The courses were so extraordinary’, he said, ‘that it was 
like going to the opera!’ in Armitage, 2001, p. 163). In 1958 Virilio returned to the 
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Atlantic coast that had been forbidden to him during the occupation – he did not see the 
sea until he was teenaged – to undertake his landmark study of the German Atlantic Wall 
defences. A work of considerable depth and duration, this confrontation with the 
blockhouses of the Second World War was published as Bunker Archeology in 1975. 
During this period, Virilio took to architecture, founding with Claude Parent the 
Architecture Principe group in 1963. This relationship produced very few buildings – a 
bunker church in Nevers completed in 1966 is possibly the most significant – and the 
partnership with Parent broke down amidst the events of 1968, leaving unfinished their 
plans for an oblique structure at the University of Nanterre. Virilio joined the student 
protesters of May ’68, occupying the Odeon and earning their admiration; afterwards, the 
students demanded that Virilio teach them at the Ecole Spéciale d’Architecture, where he 
became Director in 1973. He recalled (in Virilio & Lotringer, 2002, p. 49) that it was at 
this point, as he focused on teaching and was no longer building, that he turned to the 
work of theory. Virilio (1999, pp. 39-40) rejected the label of philosopher and, observing 
his contemporaries in the French intellectual scene, marked out his difference by saying 
that his object of study was not the subject but the traject, the trajectories between people 
and, by extension, the question of proximity and contact. He spent much of his time 
outside of work helping those who, as he saw it, had been dispossessed by its 
transformation – left homeless or destitute by precarity and automation (see Armitage, 




Perhaps the simplest way to introduce Virilio’s approach to writing theory is to first 
introduce its critics. Even Virilio’s firmest supporters concede that his writing can be ‘odd 
and oblique’ (Armitage & Bishop, 2013, p. 1), and that his ‘occasionally eccentric 
writings and accelerated style’ (Armitage, 2011, p. 17) can be off-putting. As Patrick 
Crogan (1999, p. 167) acknowledges, Virilio’s rapid-fire construction and accumulation 
of concepts opens the door to criticism as to the substance and rigor of his argumentation. 
Douglas Kellner (1999), Scott McQuire (1999) and Nigel Thrift (2011) each point to 
Virilio’s pessimism with regards to technology as a considerable fault. For Kellner (1999, 
p. 103), Virilio is ‘excessively negative and one-sided’, to the point of technophobia, 
whilst McQuire (1999, p. 154) highlights his reputation as a ‘doomsayer’; all three writers 
are agreed that this forecloses any possibility in Virilio’s thinking that technology can be 
emancipatory, with Thrift (2011, p. 147) adding that his ‘relentless negativism’ is out of 
kilter with a ‘politics of hope’. A related criticism is that Virilio has a ‘propensity to 
exaggerate’ (Kellner, 1999, p. 111), which Thrift (2011, p. 151) considers to be ‘of more 
than mild concern’. And McQuire and Kellner each suggest a kind of conservativism at 
the heart of Virilio’s work, with Kellner (1999, p. 120) arguing that he substitutes 
moralism for analysis, and McQuire (1999, p. 154) that he is nostalgic for pre-




These criticisms are certainly viable, but there is room for a more generous reading. 
Virilio justified his negativity by comparing his work to that of the art critic: ‘I am a critic 
of the art of technology’ (in Virilio & Lotringer, 1997, p. 172). His job, then, was to find 
fault; without criticism of technology, Virilio (1999, p. 11) wagered, there could be no 
progress with technology. He also described himself, in interviews with Niels Brügger 
and Nicholas Zurbrugg respectively, as a ‘conceptual activist’ (in Armitage, 2001, p. 96), 
whose work ‘takes things to the limit and to excess’ (in Armitage, 2001, p. 162), and 
whose role was to always consider the worst. Theoretical work need not limit itself to 
describing the world as it is; it has a responsibility to take it towards the better. Pessimism, 
even where it is exaggerated for effect – what John Tomlinson (2007, p. 59) characterises 
as Virilio’s use of ‘dramatic overstatement’ as a stylistic device – is not opposed to a 
politics of hope if it is used to reject the worst. Virilio’s approach, then, was one that 
forced his readers to confront the darkest possibilities of what is otherwise contingent and 
ambiguous in order that we might be hyper-focused on eradicating the negative and 
retaining the positive. As such, we ought to avoid reading Virilio’s work as moralistic, 
which is a broadly conservative disposition, and instead as that of a conceptual activist 
whose pessimism underwrote the possibility of a brighter reading of the future. Ian James 
(2013, p. 227) rejects the idea that Virilio is nostalgic (for immediacy and presence and 
bodily experience) and positions him instead as a phenomenologist of perception with a 
radical bent. John Armitage (2011, pp. 3-5) identifies Merleau-Ponty – to whom James 
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alludes – along with Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger (and we should not forget 
Wahl) as the key influences on Virilio’s thought. Situated in this way, Virilio’s centring 
and privileging of first-hand experience and the first-person narrative looks less like 
nostalgia and more like justifiable methodology. Virilio’s project was then to reveal 
modes of perception that repeat the same and obliterate the other, a task James 
characterises as affirmative rather than conservative. The phenomenological tradition 
from which he emerged had largely passed over the question of speed (see Tomlinson, 
2007, p. 8), but Virilio centred this in order to extend an understanding of our lifeworld 
in a digital society. His account of trajectory – ‘which means that I go toward the other’ 
(Virilio, 1999, p. 81) – defends a kind of moral encounter. His ‘technophobia’ was a stand 
against the sensorial privation that comes about through adapted modes of perception, 
where we no longer see but instead review in a way that leads to ‘the repetition of the 
same’ (Virilio, 2008a, pp. 34-35). Virilio’s concern was with the way that the speed of 
technology might lead to ‘the rejection of the other’ (Virilio, 2008a, p. 35), by bringing 
about changes in the way that we are present to others in the world. As Arthur Kroker 
(2011, p. 164) suggests, this work is ‘deeply ethical’, but far from being conservative, 
stands radical as a kind of ‘ethical dissent’ (p. 158) against the seduction of technology 





The Repulsion of Proximity 
 
In 2010, the Japanese Cabinet Office estimated that there were approximately 700,000 
hikikomori – abbreviated from shakaiteki hikikomori, a literal translation from the English 
social withdrawal – living in Japan, with Saitō Tamaki (2013) placing the figure closer 
to one million, given the difficulty in accounting for people who shut themselves away 
from society. Franco Berardi (2015, pp. 159-160) sets out the criteria for hikikomori 
status – spending most of nearly every day shut indoors; avoiding social situations; 
interruption of relationships; negative impact on employment or education; and being in 
such a position for at least six months – and adds that there are another 1.55m people in 
Japan who are on the verge. Stability of environment is crucial for someone experiencing 
this kind of social withdrawal (Saitō, 2013, pp. 137-138), with Michael Zielenziger (2016, 
p. 19) observing: ‘The only space they can control is their own bedroom’. Saitō (2013, p. 
37, p. 79) puts this down to a ‘fear of others’ or ‘social phobia’, but whereas Zielenziger 
(2006, p. 17) believes that the phenomenon cannot be found in other cultures, Saitō (2013, 
p. 6) rejects the idea that it is a peculiarly Japanese pathology. He observes that in Japan, 
hikikomori is used interchangeably with the British acronym NEET (Not in Education, 
Employment or Training), and argues that in other countries, people who experience this 
intense disengagement from society simply end up on the streets rather than locked away 
in a bedroom at their parents’ home. The warning has been lost, as media focus on social 
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media and videogames has taken the term away from this association and given it a global 
currency. Saitō (2013, p. 5) notes 300,000 hikikomori in South Korea, often attributed to 
addiction to e-sports and online gaming. In the US, the figure of the corpulent 
housebound, permanently online and gaming, subsisting off take-away and defecating in 
jars, has captured the imagination (see Gozlan, 2012). This is curious, given that neither 
Zielenziger nor Saitō attribute any significance to digital culture in their studies. Kato 
Takahiro, a professor of neuropsychology, says that the hikikomori phenomenon is not 
caused by addiction to the internet or to video games – but he observes that these things 
‘reduce the need for face-to-face communication’ (in Gozlan, 2012).  
 
Paul Virilio might have seen in the hikikomori an example of the ‘domestic inertia’ (2000, 
p. 70) exemplified in his work by Howard Hughes, the reclusive billionaire who shared 
with the bogeyman videogame addict a tendency to hide away and to bottle his own bodily 
emissions (see Virilio, 2009, pp. 33-37). A similar figure, of the ‘terminal-man’ (see 
Virilio, 2008b, p. 11), reappears across his work, a character that looks a lot like the 
western media version of the hikikomori: housebound and glued to screens – terminal in 
every sense. Virilio’s terminal-man prefers the distant over the near and has all but given 
up on those around him in favour of those he can connect with around the world from the 
comfort of his bedroom (see Virilio, 2008b, p. 20). This is a kind of digital bunkerism 
that, Virilio suggested (in Virilio & Lotringer, 2002, p. 88), reappears in society after the 
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blockhouses of the Second World War have fallen into obsolescence. But the danger is 
that we look too closely at Virilio’s exaggerated (and perhaps crude) imagery and lose 
sight of the argument he is making about the connection between speed and inertia. His 
is not so much an argument that digital communications create shut-ins – even if, as John 
Tomlinson (2007, p. 103) argues, it was a mistake to so emphasise sedentariness when 
digital technology seems to be fully integrated with the mobility of bodies – but that they 
impact upon the way we orient our existence in the world and towards others. That is to 
say that this bunkerism is not total (very few people are this isolated) and is perhaps only 
rarely maximally present in any given interaction, but as an exaggerated type it poses 
questions about those small but frequent episodes of moral experience that bear its 
hallmark.  
 
‘Where is being-in-the-world’, Virilio (2012b, p. 56) asked, ‘in the era where speed is at 
the limit?’ When we communicate via the screen, he argued, we get the visibility of a face 
but not the face as a vision, as a revelation of the other (Virilio, 2012a, p. 29). There is 
information but a denuded mode of sensation, a less than full encounter that Virilio 
(2010b, p. 78) suggested is missing tactility and urgency. This makes it a kind of ‘false 
proximity’ or perhaps ‘the imposture of immediacy’ (Virilio, 2002, p. 40), since it lacks 
the ‘vivacious’ and the ‘vivid’ dimensions of the proximate encounter (Virilio, 2008a, p. 
40), the spontaneous existence of another person that needs to be navigated here and now. 
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Virilio (2008b, p. 104) argued that we have come ‘to take the shadow for the substance’ 
perhaps even to prefer the spectre of the other to ‘the substantial being who gets in your 
way, who is literally on your hands’. This would be a foreclosure of moral trajectory. 
Virilio’s point, like that of Kato, was that digital communication reduces the need for the 
face-to-face – and, more than this, that there is something morally important about such 
proximate encounters. We are then offered the terminal-man as an exaggerated grotesque 
to starken the warning, which is that when we can exert greater control over the 
environment of the encounter, by migrating interaction to the screen, where the barriers 
to entrance and exit are lower, we lose an experience that is vital. In Virilio’s terms, the 
‘window replaces the door’ (2012a, p. 135), which is to say that the visibility of the other 
replaces the welcome for the other. When things become images on screens, they lose 
their weight, such that ‘figures without density prevail over things within reach’ (Virilio, 
2008b, p. 26). The triumph of speed in communication is a triumph over gravity; Virilio 
(2008a, p. 135) said that ‘it has done away with inaccessible heights’. It is useful to read 
this through the lens of the work of Emmanuel Levinas (2007), who shared with Virilio 
his Husserl-Heidegger lineage. What has weight? The other, whose existence must be 
navigated in the encounter, whose existence forces us to negotiate our own existence in 
the world. What has gravity? Responsibility, the gravest of relationships, since this 
navigation and negotiation should not refuse the burden of the other in favour of a lighter 
load and an easier road. And what speaks to us from an inaccessible height? The demand 
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for responsibility, which emanates from the other who is unknowable because they are 
other, whose face is a vision that breaks with the same and opens to infinity. This is heavy 
stuff, and we can choose to mitigate it by reducing the immediacy of the encounter. This 
suggests what we might call the repulsion of proximity: the encounter with the other is 
scary because it is risky – because it binds us in a moral relationship without ontological 
security. So, we turn to the ‘electromagnetic prophylactic’ (Virilio, 2008b, p. 104) 
whenever we want to feel protected from the contingency of responsibility, the safer 
option, just as we take the easier option when we choose the escalator over the stairs. 
 
The western media have missed the point about the hikikomori: these are not (necessarily) 
digital junkies, but people left behind by society – the same people, dislocated by 
globalisation and automation, that Virilio had taken to caring for later in his life. And if 
we read Virilio as a technophobe or an irredeemable pessimist, then we risk missing the 
point too. Just as inter-personal communication can be greatly aided by the use of digital 
media, the same tool can also be called upon to opt out of the moral burden of the 
encounter where desired. We have not become like Howard Hughes or the hikikomori – 
totally isolated like Virilio’s terminal-man – simply because we sometimes have a 
preference for mediated communication; but we can protect ourselves from the contingent 
risk and responsibility of certain kinds of encounters by streaming those encounters to 
screens. In which case, we are not really isolated at all; we see those others, but we isolate 
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them from the full scope of our moral experience. The repulsion of proximity is then 
manifested in electing out of responsibility, which is one of the perversities of moral 
experience given that the repulsion emanates from the experience of responsibility itself. 
To be clear, and as Tomlinson (2007, p. 111) argues, mediated communication is not 
inherently deficient in comparison to co-presence; but it takes on a negative disposition 
when it becomes conveniently evasive. So, what becomes of the Japanese youth, the 
British NEET, the global homeless when our ways of experiencing the world become, 
like the hikikomori, more risk-averse? They are seen but they are not welcomed. We end 
up with what Virilio (2008a, p. 141) called ‘dromogenous space’: the refusal of the other 
in a society jolted by the ‘postindustrial rhythm’ of techno-capitalist development 
(Virilio, 2012b, p. 45). Ultimately, Virilio (2008b, p. 64) forces us to confront a very 
simple question: what is the point of seeing if it does not draw us towards the other? 
 
 
The Colonisation of Speed 
 
In 2012, the charity Invisible Children uploaded a video to YouTube with a seemingly 
simple objective: to make its subject, the warlord Joseph Kony, so famous that the world 
powers would do something about him. Kony had been leading the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, massacring, displacing 
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and enslaving populations in the course of a seemingly incomprehensible terror campaign 
(see Meek, 2012). The charity’s video, Kony 2012, focused on his recruitment of child 
soldiers, with the hope that moral repugnance would lead to the video being shared and 
shared some more until it became viral. Behind such a strategy is the hope that something 
like social media can increase awareness, and that awareness will then translate into 
response. It was hugely successful on the first count, with 100m views inside a week 
(Keesey, 2015). What the video missed, however, was the way that much of the violence 
that fuelled the demand for child soldiers was part of a struggle for the mineral wealth of 
the central African region. As Christian Fuchs (2014, pp. 172-173) reports, control over 
the mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where slave labour working in lethally 
unsafe conditions is forced to extract cobalt and coltan from the earth, is at the same time 
control over a small but vital part of a supply chain that leads all the way through to the 
device on which we watch and like and share our YouTube videos. ‘Without Congolese 
conflict minerals’, writes Jack Linchuan Qiu (2016, p. 22), ‘there would have been much 
less a boom in the world system of electronic gadgets’. 
 
Paul Virilio once said that ‘space is no longer in geography – it’s in electronics’ (in Virilio 
& Lotringer, 1997, p. 114). Well, as Jussi Parikka (2015, p. 46) observes, those electronics 
– our smartphones and tablets and notebooks – contain tiny parts of distant lands, the 
logistics of communication and information tying us into a neo-colonial struggle over 
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scarce mineral resources. Virilio (2008a, p. 73) noted that logistics was much more about 
the management of time than of territory; logistics, he always reminded us, was developed 
to pursue greater speeds of warfare before becoming the dizzying logic behind the global 
production and distribution of things like flip-flops and computers (see also Bonneuil & 
Fressoz, 2017, pp. 137-141). The conflict across borders in central Africa is a reminder 
of this connection. The struggle for control over the minerals that go into digital 
technologies brings logistics back to its roots. As Virilio (1990, pp. 65-66) argued, 
environmental disasters are only terrifying for civilians; for the military, they are an 
opportunity to ransack natural resources – and to study the violent chaos for future 
reference. (On Virilio’s ‘war machine’ and the management of civilian populations see 
Wood, 2004, p. 394; on the connection of the military and climate change see Marzec, 
2016, pp. 391-393.) He would have recognised, then, that the ultimate ecological 
catastrophe – running out of the things of the earth – plays out in places like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo as a paramilitary conquest of mines and minerals, since 
whoever controls the stuff of technology, who conquers the infrastructure of 
communication, partakes in the wealth of speed. Virilio (1986, p. 64) characterised 
logistics as ‘an assault on the world’; the logistics behind digital viability are locating the 
battlefields of the future. He argued that all ecological struggles emanate from speed 
(Virilio, 1990, p. 89), such that you cannot deal with green ecology without also 
addressing ‘grey ecology’ (2000, p. 82), or, the pollution of ‘nature’s real size’ and the 
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‘exposure of the world’ by our demand for speed (1999, p. 59) – of transmission, of 
consumption, of interaction (see Featherstone, 2003, p. 197). Speed is as much to blame 
for environmental pollution as it is for car crashes (Virilio, 2007, p. 11). And if Virilio is 
correct then the military is already drilling for the ecological catastrophe to come; as such, 
we might heed his advice to join green politics with grey politics and mobilise for 
ourselves – or for our planet. 
 
The example of Invisible Children also says something about the logistics of perception. 
David Meek (2012, p. 1431) argued that the use of YouTube by the charity behind Kony 
2012 increases awareness and forges connections that can be used to resist the violent 
excess of the Lord’s Resistance Army. These viral campaigns are seen to act as an 
‘information intervention’ that expands the user’s moral geography (Meek, 2012, p. 
1436). The point to make is not so much that this did not work – Joseph Kony has so far 
escaped justice – but that the account of moral perception does not work. Any account of 
moral responsibility grounded in an encounter with the other or awareness of their 
suffering is arguably without limitation, since, as Emmanuel Levinas (2008a) argues, any 
calculation of who to hold deserving over others obliterates the singularity of the 
relationship. A greater quantity of awareness, then, might increase the number of apparent 
responsibilities we ought to act on. But this does not guarantee that there will be more 
moral response, especially given that ‘the bulk of what I see is, in fact and in principle, 
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no longer within my reach’ (Virilio, 1996b, p. 7). Considering the functioning of the eye, 
Virilio (1996a, p. 4) argued that without visual limits you could not see anything; that is, 
when you can see everything, anywhere, you see nothing – at least in the sense of valuing 
what you see. Moral existence is always already infinitely demanding; the boundlessness 
of what we can see through things like YouTube does not change this, it simply extends 
the scope of our moral failure. More than this, when we consider the ecological costs of 
our extended visualisation, this moral picture becomes unsustainable. Infinite 
responsibility comes up against finite media. As Sean Cubitt (2017, p. 6) has argued, 
digital media are deeply dependent on energy and natural resources, despite their 
immaterial reputation, such that our communication technologies communicate our own 
dismissive relation to the natural environment. Data centres, for example, are the fastest 
growing contributors to emission growth (Cubitt, 2017, p. 16). And the demand for 
energy, of burning carbon fuels to sustain our digital infrastructure, and the pollution this 
creates, disproportionately affects the global south and the victims of colonialism (Cubitt, 
2017, p. 35). The information intervention made by digital technology is to accelerate 
suffering in the poorest parts of the world, following and sustaining the crimes of empire. 
The conflict Kony 2012 highlights is the unconscious of our technological consumption; 





We might not be able to touch everything that we see – it might ‘no longer [be] inscribed 
on the map of the “I can”’ (Virilio, 1996b, p. 7) – but our mode of seeing has an impact 
on what is visualised. The grey ecology of the pollution of distance laps against the green 
ecology of the pollution of substance. As Virilio declared, in an interview with Pierre 
Sterckx: ‘I am trying to promote an ecology of qualities, an ecology that is both material 
and spiritual’ (in Armitage, 2001, p. 147). His work suggests strongly that we confuse 
visualisation with the vision of the other, the revelation of my responsibility for suffering, 
all the time ignoring the material impact of our drive for digital speed. In the case of Kony 
2012, we see the ‘integral accident’ of technology, whereby the technofix only serves to 
perpetuate the crisis (see Van Valkenburgh, 2018, p. 808). Under these conditions, the 
distant fares as badly as the near. 
 
 
The Diversion of Trajectory 
 
It is estimated that in 2016 around 110m wearable sensors or self-tracking devices were 
shipped worldwide (Neff & Nagus, 2016). As Deborah Lupton (2016, p. 4) notes, people 
have always measured themselves in various ways, but what makes the boom in self-
tracking devices different is the way that digitalisation combines with connectivity to 
cloud computing so that those measurements are no longer reviewed only by the 
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measurer, and that the data collected now has immense commercial value. They allow for 
the tracking of things like health, fitness, sleep or mood, with sensors built into the devices 
to measure things like heart rate or body temperature, and a range of apps are available 
for smartphones that can tap into their various sensors (such as gyroscopes, GPS or 
accelerometers) to extend their application. Perhaps most common are those wearable 
devices designed to track fitness, such as the Fitbit wristband, or the various apps that 
transform smartphones or smartwatches into something similar. Chris Till (2014) focuses 
on these exercise aides – or impersonal trainers – designed to help people get into shape, 
arguing that they transform individual health activities into forms of labour, since 
something like going for a jog now generates a range of data for companies to capitalise 
on. Till (2014, p. 451) picks up on the way that the commodification of exercise goes 
hand in hand with the gamification of health, where people use apps to compete with 
users on distances run or completion times or other achievements, such as cycling 
particular hills or routes. That is, the more people compete, the more data they share to 
mark their achievements. Strava, a cycling and running app, calls this competitive 
comparison ‘social fitness’ (in Lupton, 2016, p. 24). 
 
On the face of it, Paul Virilio (2010b, p. 103) was dismissive of the exercise boom, 
describing it as ‘crazily aimless jogging around’. However, scratch beneath the surface, 
and throw in the self-tracking devices, and there is a more vital point in there about how 
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we orient ourselves in the world. His negativity about going for a run seems to stem from 
his concern for trajectory, here rendered banal by the excursion without objective, where 
all that matters, he argued, was acceleration – and not where you are going (Virilio, 
2010b, p. 105). Jogging may be goal-oriented in terms of getting fit or hitting targets, but 
this overwhelms the purpose of the journey, with the pursuit of records or fastest times 
reducing the body to an instrument of speed (Virilio, 1996a, p. 109). Introduce ‘electronic 
trinkets’ (Virilio, 2012c, p. 54) such as the Fitbit fitness tracker or other such ‘automatic 
diagnostics’ (Virilio, 2012a, p. 65), and the body is further transformed into an instrument 
of measurement. But this is not a kind of measurement grounded in the life-size (such as 
feet) or in the earth (as in the original definition of the metre) but in light, in speed, and 
the result is that we no longer trust our senses but defer perception to measuring machines 
(Virilio, 2012a, p. 58). We are becoming, Virilio (2012a, p. 65) argued, ‘conditioned by 
statistics’. And when space is treated as statistical rather than sensorial, measurement 
ceases to be a mirror in which we fix ourselves and becomes instead a corridor down 
which we hurry (Virilio, 2012a, p. 92). 
 
Similarly, when we travel at speed, we do not so much traverse the landscape as perforate 
it – see right through it – as if we bring that corridor, perhaps now a tunnel, out with us 
into the world (Virilio, 2008a, p. 104). Speed without journey, or a movement without 
orientation, delocalises time, now no longer extensive but instead intensive (Virilio, 2000, 
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p. 62). In excursion without destination, where what matters is moving but not where you 
are moving or who you are moving towards, we occupy the instant at the expense of the 
future – of ‘the value of time’ (Virilio, 1999, p. 81) – and so we can no longer speak here 
of trajectory. For Emmanuel Levinas (2008b), for whom the present was a hypostasis, a 
solitude only broken by the relationship to the other which takes us towards the future, or 
a movement towards the future that takes us towards the other, time and ethics are 
inextricable. As they were for Virilio (1999, p. 81), for whom trajectory ‘means going 
towards the other’, something broken by inhabiting the instant encouraged by speed 
without end, without futurity. The self-tracker, as Virilio (2000, p. 64) argued of a much 
broader range of high-speed measuring devices, encourages us to shut ourselves away, 
not in the home, as with the hikikomori, but in ourselves. Virilio (2008b) asked us to take 
the study of trajectivity as seriously as that of subjectivity, but it should be clear that the 
two are intimately entangled in his work. Care for the self allows for recollection, for a 
readying of oneself to go out into a world of others with all the contingent moral 
encounters that entails. Looking in a mirror is not necessarily narcissism, or rather can be 
a kind of responsible narcissism, when looking after ourselves better equips us to look 
after others. But when we are encouraged to see health and fitness and self-care as a means 
of competition, co-opted into a digital race without end, without orientation towards the 
other, then we lose the trajectory. And trajectory, as a movement towards the other – for 




Co-opted by whom? Virilio (2010a, p. 12) observed that ‘every time the speed of 
movement increases, monitoring and traceability increase in step’. These geolocation 
technologies, he argued, are little better than the ankle tags fitted to criminals on probation 
(Virilio, 2010b, p. 84), constantly relaying information back to the corporations that 
supply and sustain our networked gadgets. Control, he argued, is now enacted in the time-
regime of technologies (see Kaun, 2017, p. 471). This feeds what Virilio called, in an 
interview with Niels Brügger, their ‘conglomerate gigantism’ (in Armitage, 2001, p. 100), 
as technology companies seek to adjust our attention and modes of perception in order to 
accumulate the wealth and power that can be derived from our data. Adrian Athique 
(2019) identifies what we now call Big Data with Virilio’s account of the Information 
Bomb, whilst Robert Hassan (2011, p. 399) evokes Virilio when he writes of ‘the tyranny 
of the algorithm’ that characterises the entrenchment of control through the speed of 
processing. Take YouTube, which might have been a useful means of stopping warlords 
in central Africa, but as ‘a zoo for the observation of mass online behaviours’, as Sean 
Cubitt (2011, p. 88) puts it, is much more useful as a way of soaking up valuable data 
regardless of the inherent value of any particular video shared on its site. Virilio (2002, 
p. 59) understood this as ‘big optics’, or the monopolisation of appearances by 
technological corporations. Our demand for fitness trackers, then, is but one more 
contribution to the growing power of platform capitalism, and the shift from democracy 
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to dromocacy – where power in society belongs to those who control the impact of speed 
on perception (Virilio & Lotringer, 1997, p. 61). Strava wants us to compete against other 
users to bag the fastest times scaling the trickiest geographical landmarks by foot or by 
cycle; Virilio (2007, p. 7) wanted us to take a stand against the loss of ethical landmarks 
when space becomes statistical rather than an opportunity to move towards others. Only 
one of these two is motivated by social fitness – and the other by the wealth and power 





What unites these explorations of shut-ins, warlords and joggers, is the question of being 
at home in the world. In one of his few explicit references to the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas, Paul Virilio (2010a, p. 30) argued that we cannot be at home in a rationalised 
world, where everyone and everything is quantifiable but anonymous, where the impact 
of speed on perception creates an uninhabitable instant that, he said, is incompatible with 
the ethics of Totality and Infinity (Levinas, 2007) or Otherwise Than Being (Levinas, 
2008a). We saw first that the control we exert over the encounter when it migrates to 
screens is incompatible with the contingency of the moral encounter. The primacy of 
visualisation strips away the responsibility communicated by the vision of the face. And 
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whilst we might not risk joining the ranks of the hikikomori, by similarly reducing the 
urgency of the face-to-face we move towards a society that is altogether less welcoming. 
A society that is inhospitable has earned its shut-ins. Then, through the viral campaigning 
of Invisible Children and Kony 2012, we saw that the pollution of distances problematises 
the moral value of the visualisation of distant suffering. What we see is no longer within 
reach and, whilst ought should not necessarily imply can, the result is more likely a 
greater awareness of moral failure than a greater quantity of moral action. And whilst 
responsibility is infinite, our media is finite, such that the mode of seeing is a means of 
pollution that furthers the neo-colonial suffering we want to alleviate. The global village 
chases itself down the mine. Finally, we saw how self-tracking devices redefine our 
perception of space, from sensorial to statistical, whilst promoting movement without 
trajectory. This lost trajectory is a movement towards the other, an ethical gesture and a 
revelation of responsibility, that can have no extension in the instant. And this loss is 
driven by corporations hungry for data and whose vision of competition and 
quantification is an imposition of sameness. In a race sponsored by big optics, the only 
prize at the finishing line is the dromogeneity of a society no longer oriented towards the 
other. Ultimately, whether it is a question of proximity, distance or time, how we perceive 
the world alters how we inhabit a world shared with others – it is bound up with the 




The work above performs a kind of mereological reading, piecing together fragments 
from across a wide range of texts and combining synthesis with interpretation; it is, as 
such, of Virilio if not entirely from Virilio. His work has been read with Levinas in mind 
but not systematically through that of Levinas, since the argument is not that Virilio was 
in any way programmatically Levinasian – in fact, he rarely mentioned him. Such a 
reading suggests that Virilio’s work begins with ethics as first philosophy and conducts a 
phenomenology of perception in order to essay the impact of technology on our way of 
being towards others in the world. This takes us away from the criticism of his project as 
one that is moralistic. Moralism is a broadly conservative position and, whilst Virilio 
defends the primacy of first-personal experience, he does so in defence of an account of 
moral experience that is radical in its concern for the other and the demands it places on 
moral existence. That said, there is perhaps no escaping Virilio’s reputation for the 
pessimistic. But then the success of thinking of the very worst is measured by its not 
coming to pass. Pessimism and optimism are not mutually exclusive, that is, some degree 
of both is necessary to think of a future that is not merely a continuation of the present – 
a repetition of the same. ‘Theory is construction’, Virilio said (in Virilio & Lotringer, 
2002, p. 160), and by focusing on the negative we might just be able to build something 
better for ourselves. For the cultural theorist, Virilio is often on hand to provide a negative 
counterbalance to thinking about technology and society, but he also offers something 
positive, even celebratory, about our experience of the intersubjective. Moving beyond 
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this image of moralism and pessimism about technology and working instead with the 
account we find of moral experience and applying it to technology and the spaces it 
encourages, would be a positive, even celebratory, use of the legacy bequeathed to us by 
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